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Abstract
We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms 
can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications 
received and on the number of offers received by the firm’s candidate. When the contract space includes 
application fees, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient, and it 
has a posted wage equal to match output. In the inefficient equilibria, the wage is below match output, 
and the value of a worker’s application depends on whether he or she receives another offer. This allows 
individual firms to free ride on one another and gives firms market power. When we endogenize the number 
of applications and allow for general mechanisms, only the efficient equilibrium survives. By allowing 
for general mechanisms, we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications 
literature.
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1. Introduction
Under what conditions do labor markets function efficiently? When there are search frictions 
and firms cannot commit to a wage or wage mechanism, we know from Hosios (1990) and 
Pissarides (2000) that workers and firms typically do not receive their marginal contributions to 
the matching process. However, when firms can commit to a wage mechanism before they meet 
workers and workers can direct their search, the common wisdom, as in Moen (1997), is that 
the market equilibrium is efficient. Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009)
challenge this result and show that when workers can simultaneously apply to multiple jobs, the 
resulting equilibrium is not efficient. However, each of these papers imposes a particular wage 
mechanism and a particular meeting technology. So their results do not necessarily imply that 
the decentralized equilibrium with multiple applications is inefficient when firms can compete 
with more general mechanisms or for other meeting technologies.
In this paper, we explore the efficiency of competitive search equilibrium1 in a labor market in 
which workers make multiple applications. For simplicity, we consider a static model. Firms can 
only consider a limited number of candidates - one in our model - even though a firm’s chosen 
applicant may have a competing offer or offers. That is, if a firm’s chosen candidate rejects its 
offer, the firm is unable to consider a second applicant, etc.2 Our contribution is to allow firms 
to choose from a set of quite general mechanisms in which they can charge application fees as 
well as conditioning wages on the number of applications they receive and the number of offers 
that their candidate receives. We show that there exists a continuum of non-payoff-equivalent 
equilibria of which only one is efficient. Allowing firms to compete with general mechanisms 
gives a better understanding of the sources behind inefficiency, in particular, restrictions on the 
set of possible mechanisms versus monopsony power.
Given that the firm can condition the wage it promises to pay on the number of offers that 
its chosen candidate has, we show that competition implies that a worker with multiple offers 
receives a wage equal to the full match surplus as in Albrecht et al. (2006). This means that 
potential equilibria are described by the wage posted for workers with no other offers and the ap-
plication fee/subsidy. Allowing firms to condition wages on the number of applications received 
turns out to play no role in our analysis. This is in contrast to Coles and Eeckhout (2003) who 
show that in a small market in which each buyer approaches only one seller, the possibility of 
conditioning prices on the number of buyers creates a continuum of equilibria that are not pay-
off equivalent. Our model also generates a continuum of non-payoff-equivalent equilibria, and 
the driving force behind the existence of multiple equilbria in our paper is similar to the one in 
1 Different papers in the literature mean different things by “competitive search.” What we mean is simply that (i) 
search is directed and (ii) the market is large enough that firms take market utility as given.
2 Similarly, in Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009), firms can consider only one candidate, al-
though in an extension Albrecht et al. (2006) also consider “shortlists” or limited recall in the sense that a firm can offer 
its job to a second applicant (if it has one) in the event that its first offer is rejected, but the process ends if the second 
candidate also turns the firm down. Shortlists reduce but do not eliminate the inefficiency associated with multiple ap-
plications. Kircher (2009) and Gautier and Holzner (2017) are papers with multiple applications that allow full recall. 
A maximum matching can be achieved in this case only if workers and firms can learn all the details of the realized 
application network. Since we believe that firms are limited in the number of applicants they can consider and limited in 
what they can learn about the application network, the setting in the current paper is the relevant one.2
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workers only care about the joint value of the instruments, and because of this, each firm has 
a continuum of best responses. However, in Coles and Eeckhout (2003), payoff-relevant multi-
plicity is a small-market phenomenon. Each seller’s posted mechanism affects buyers’ market 
utility, but in a large market this effect disappears so that all equilibria become payoff equivalent. 
In contrast, in our model, payoff-relevant multiplicity is a large-market phenomenon. Equilibria 
that are characterized by different wage-fee pairs are not payoff equivalent in a large market be-
cause in all but one of the equilibria, firms have joint monopsony power (the source of which is 
discussed below).
In all equilibria, we find that firms charge positive application fees. Although fees deter ap-
plications, this effect is small because workers primarily care about generating multiple offers. 
When we allow both for fees and for wages conditioned on the number of offers, the wage for a 
selected applicant with no other offers can exceed the worker’s reservation value. Relative to the 
case in Albrecht et al. (2006) with no application fee, firms do not have the incentive to reduce 
the wage all the way to the workers’ reservation value because doing so would lead to fewer 
applicants and thus less revenue from application fees. Equilibria with a relatively high fee and 
a high posted wage (that the worker receives in case he or she has no other offers) can coexist 
with equilibria with a low fee and a low wage. From the continuum of equilibria, only one is 
efficient and it has a posted wage equal to match output together with an application fee equal to 
the firm’s expected contribution to the match divided by the expected queue length. The efficient 
wage and fee ensures that workers receive their expected contribution to match surplus.
In actual labor markets, we rarely observe application fees. One reason for this is that workers 
may be reluctant to pay an application fee if they cannot observe whether the advertised job is 
real or bogus (see Cheron and Decreuse (2017) and Albrecht et al. (2019)). In the market for 
higher education, where applicants know that colleges will admit students, we do observe fees. 
However, if for whatever reason, firms cannot charge application fees, the market equilibrium is 
not efficient.
When workers apply to only one job, efficiency arises because (i) firms must offer workers 
the market utility, (ii) in a large market, firms take the market utility as given, and (iii) firms are 
residual claimants to the surplus so it is in their interest to offer efficient mechanisms.3 When 
workers send out multiple applications, firms no longer can offer each applicant the market util-
ity. Instead, firms offer workers the possibility of creating optimal application portfolios. The 
worker’s payoff depends on his or her entire portfolio so a firm’s expected payoff also depends 
on what happens to the applications that a worker sends to other firms. This is not something the 
firm can directly price. If workers can only apply to one job, the problem reduces to one of firms 
buying queues in a competitive market.
Bertrand competition for workers with multiple offers is not enough for efficiency. In our 
model, firms extract rents by lowering the wage when their chosen candidate has no other offers 
(in conjunction with application fees). That is, firms have market power even though search is 
directed and there is Bertrand competition, because the probability that the firm’s candidate has 
another offer is less than one. Firms have joint monopsony power because worker value comes 
from the entire application portfolio. If other firms offer a bad deal (a low wage when their 
3 See, for example, Albrecht et al. (2014), Cai et al. (2018), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010a), and Peters (2013) for a 
literature review.3
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also explains why we have a continuum of non-payoff-equivalent equilibria.
Efficiency under multiple applications requires that (i) the worker who is hired receives a 
wage equal to the match output regardless of whether this worker has other offers (otherwise, 
by the argument above, firms have market power) and implies that (ii) the worker receives his or 
her marginal contribution to the match. The only way that (i) and (ii) can be satisfied simultane-
ously is with a positive application fee. When workers send one application, condition (i) is not 
necessary so in that case, efficiency can be obtained without fees.
The above discussion suggests a simple scenario in which firms’ market power disappears: 
the worker who is hired receives a wage equal to match output regardless of whether this worker 
has other offers. In this case, firm value is realized through application fees. Fees play a different 
role in our model than in the previous literature where fees arise because workers are risk-averse, 
there is incomplete information, or there is congestion in the meeting process. For example in 
Jacquet and Tan (2012) and Julien and Roger (2019), the application fee can be thought of as 
an insurance premium that the worker buys in order to get compensated when he or she is not 
hired. In Albrecht and Jovanovic (1986), fees arise due to incomplete information in pairwise 
matching markets. Fees or two-part tariffs have been studied extensively in the industrial organi-
zation literature; e.g., Armstrong and Vickers (2001), Rochet and Stole (2002), Yin (2004), and 
Thanassoulis (2007) show that firms offer a single two-part tariff with a marginal price equal 
to marginal cost in equilibrium. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) extends the above framework to 
allow consumers to buy different goods from different suppliers and find that firms offer a menu 
of efficient two-part tariffs with a discount for bundling that encourages buyers to do one-stop 
shopping. However, in this literature, firms don’t face capacity constraints and a consumer’s pay-
off at one firm does not depend on what he or she must pay at other firms. Finally, in Lester 
et al. (2015) and Cai et al. (2017, 2018), fees are critical for efficiency because they can price 
congestion externalities in the meeting process.
In our inefficient equilibria, workers with one offer receive a wage that is less than the full 
surplus. The value for the worker of applying to multiple jobs is the potential to generate multiple 
offers. This creates congestion without increasing output and is thus a pure rent-seeking activ-
ity. In the efficient equilibrium, after paying the application fee, workers become the residual 
claimants of the match surplus. The reason to apply to multiple jobs is to increase the probabil-
ity of getting at least one offer and since the offered wage equals the match output there are no 
additional rewards for generating more than one offer.
We also consider two extensions to our model. First, we introduce an application cost and 
endogenize the number of worker applications. For simplicity, we assume that the number of 
applications is a continuous variable. We find that a unique equilibrium exists and show that 
both firm entry and the number of applications per worker are efficient. In our second extension, 
we consider restrictions on the set of feasible wage mechanisms. We then relate our results to 
Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009). Albrecht et al. (2006) allow firms to 
condition their wage on the number of offers that their candidate has, but they do not allow for 
fees. If firms are allowed to post fees in their setting, an equilibrium in which firms post a zero 
wage for workers with no other offers (as in Albrecht et al. (2006)) exists, but now firms would 
also charge a positive application fee. This would make the Albrecht et al. (2006) equilibrium 
even more inefficient. However, with fees, this is only one of a continuum of equilibria including 
an efficient one with a posted wage equal to the match surplus. Allowing for fees in the Galeni-
anos and Kircher (2009) setting creates a unique pure-strategy equilibrium which is efficient, but 
there is also at least one mixed-strategy equilibrium which is inefficient.4
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2–4. In Section 2, we present our model; in Section 3, we characterize its equilibria; and in 
Section 4, we examine the (in)efficiency of these equilibria. Then in Section 5, we extend our 
model by endogenizing the number of worker applications. Finally, in Section 6, we consider the 
implications of restricting the set of possible mechanisms available to firms.
2. The model
Our model is static and consists of four stages: (i) firms post a wage mechanism; (ii) workers 
send their applications; (iii) firms select at most one candidate and workers with one or multiple 
offers choose one offer; (iv) production takes place.
2.1. Setup
Agents There is a continuum of identical unemployed workers (measure u) and a continuum 
of identical firms each with one vacancy (measure v). Both firms and workers are risk neutral. 
Initially, we take v as exogenous. We later endogenize v by allowing for free entry of vacancies. 
The productivity of a match is normalized to 1.
Multiple applications Each firm posts and commits to a wage mechanism to attract workers. 
After observing all wage mechanisms, each worker sends a job applications, where a is a positive 
integer. We assume for now that a is exogenous. In Section 5, we endogenize a by assuming 
application costs. Since we consider a large market, we assume that workers cannot coordinate 
their application strategies, and we look for equilibria in which workers use symmetric strategies. 
This is a standard assumption in the literature (see e.g., Moen, 1997; Burdett et al., 2001; Shimer, 
2005).
Wage mechanism In the most general case we consider, we suppose that workers can credibly 
show the firm the other offers that they have received and that firms can credibly show the worker 
their other applications.4 In this case, a wage mechanism, (f, wij ), is a fee, f , and a set of wages 
that may depend on the number of offers the worker receives, i, and the number of applications 
the firm receives, j , where i = 1, 2, . . . , a and j = 1, . . . , ∞. f is the application fee to be 
paid by workers and f < 0 implies an application subsidy. wij is the wage when the worker 
has i offers in total (including the one from the current firm) and the firm has j applications 
(including the one from the worker it has selected). Given that firms do not observe the entire 
application network (which is a bipartite graph consisting of a set of workers and a set of firms 
linked together by a set of edges which are the applications), they cannot condition the wage on 
the number of applications at the other firms where their candidate applied. If workers receive 
multiple offers they select the highest and in case of a tie, they simply randomize. Finally, we 
rule out the case in which a firm’s wage mechanism depends on the wage mechanisms at the 
other firms to which their candidate has applied. That is, we rule out wage mechanisms such as 
4 Although we allow for the possibility here, we show below that firms’ optimal wage mechanisms do not depend on 
the number of applications they have.5
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possible wage mechanisms, e.g., ruling out fees.
No recall Firms simultaneously select one applicant (if they have any) and offer the wage spec-
ified in the mechanism. The worker can then accept or reject the offer and after that the game 
ends. This means we do not allow for recall. That is, if the firm’s chosen applicant does not take 
the offer, we do not allow the firm to select another applicant.
Meeting technologies Consider a firm with expected queue length λ; i.e., λ is the expected 
number of workers applying to the firm. The meeting process is constant-returns-to-scale and 
characterized by a sequence of probability functions {pn(λ) : n = 0, 1, 2, . . . }, where pn(λ)
is the probability that a firm receives n applications. We assume that the expected number 
of applications equals the expected queue length. That is, 
∑∞
n=1 npn(λ) = λ for any λ ≥ 0. 
Eeckhout and Kircher (2010b) called this property nonrival. We are especially interested in 
m(λ) ≡ 1 − p0(λ), the probability that the firm receives at least one application.6 We assume 
that m(λ) is increasing and strictly concave. Furthermore, we assume that limλ→0 m′(λ) = 1 and 
limλ→∞ m(λ) −λm′(λ) = 1, which are standard assumptions in the literature and ensure that the 
marginal contribution to surplus of firms (respectively, workers) is one when the measure of firms 
(respectively, workers) is zero. Note that if all firms face the same expected queue length, then 
that common expected queue length is λ = au/v since each worker sends out a applications. In 
general, the expected queue length depends on the wage mechanism and may vary from firm to 
firm.
If a firm receives n applications (an n-to-1 meeting), then the firm chooses a particular worker 
with probability 1/n, so all workers who apply have the same probability to receive an offer 
from that firm. By an accounting identity, the probability that an application ends up in an n-
to-1 meeting is qn(λ) = npn(λ)/λ, where n ≥ 1, and the probability that an application leads 
to an offer from that firm is 
∑∞
n=1 qn(λ)/n, which is simply m(λ)/λ. Finally, since we assume 
that meetings are nonrival, applications always arrive at firms, i.e. 
∑∞
n=1 qn(λ) = 1. Following 
Moen (1997) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010a), we do not assume a particular functional form 
for the meeting technology m(λ). Special cases include the urn ball, m(λ) = 1 − e−λ, and the 
geometric, m(λ) = λ/(1 + λ), both of which are extensively used in the literature.7 Keeping 
m(λ) general allows us to see how properties of the equilibrium wage mechanism depend on the 
meeting technology.
For notational convenience, let h(λ) denote the probability that an application fails to lead to 
an offer:
h(λ) = 1 − m(λ)
λ
. (1)
5 Albrecht et al. (2006) consider offer-beating strategies in a model of competitive search with multiple applications. In 
their setting, offer-beating strategies reduce but do not eliminate the inefficiencies associated with multiple applications.
6 Assuming nonrivalry does not restrict the functional form of m(λ). For any m(λ), one can construct a nonrival meeting 
technology as follows. The meeting technology has two stages. In the first stage, workers and firms meet according to 
a bilateral meeting technology p0(λ) = 1 − m(λ) and p1(λ) = m(λ). The applications that failed to reach a firm in the 
first stage arrive in the second stage, according to an urn-ball meeting (or any nonrival meeting technology), at one of the 
firms that received applicants in the first stage.




, where n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
n! 1+λ 1+λ
6
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As λ → ∞, λh′(λ)
h(λ)
→ 0.
2.2. Payoffs and equilibrium
We look for a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which all firms choose the same wage 
mechanism (f, wij ), where i = 1, 2, . . . , a and j = 1, . . . , ∞. If all firms post the same wage 
mechanism (f, wij ), workers will send their a applications randomly and independently. Recall 
that pj (λ) is the probability that a firm receives j applications, and qj (λ) is the probability that 
an application faces competition from j −1 other applications. The expected payoff or the market 
utility of workers is given by














· · · qji (λ)
ji
max(wij1 ,wij2, . . . ,wiji ),
(3)
where the first term gives the sum of application fees, the summand in the second term reflects 
the scenario in which the worker receives i offers out of a applications, and the first offer is from 
a firm who has received j1 applications. Recall that wijk is the promised wage at a firm that has 
received jk applications when the selected worker has i offers in total. A worker with i offers, 
selects the highest one and in case of a tie, the worker randomizes among all firms that offer the 
highest wage. Recall that h(λ) is the probability that an application fails to lead to an offer, and 
qj (λ)/j is the probability that an application results in an offer when the firm has j − 1 other 
candidates.






jf + (1 − w1j )h(λ)a−1 +
a∑
i=2
(1 − wij )Pij
)
. (4)
The first term inside the large parentheses on the right-hand side is the fee income the firm 
receives when it has j applicants. The second term equals the additional profit in case its selected 
applicant has no other offers, which happens with probability h(λ)a−1. Finally, Pij in the last 
term denotes the probability that the firm has j applicants and the chosen applicant has i > 1











· · · qji−1(λ)
ji−1
C(wij ,wij1, . . . ,wiji−1) (5)
where the summand reflects the scenario in which the selected worker has i −1 offers from his or 
her other a−1 applications, and the first offer of the i−1 offers is from a firm that has received j1
applications so that the wage is wij1 , and so on. When the wage from the firm under consideration 
is not the highest of the i offers that the worker received, i.e., wij < max(wij1 , . . . , wiji−1), then 
function C, or the firm’s winning probability, is zero. When wij is strictly larger than the other i−7
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equals 1/n since workers randomize over the n highest wage offers with equal probability. Thus, 
the function C is a counting function, and it is formally defined by C(wi,j , wij1, . . . , wiji−1) =
i−1k=1I(wij ≥ wijk )(
∑i−1
k=1 I(wij = wijk ))−1, where I is the standard indicator function.
Now consider the problem of a potential deviant firm. If the deviant firm posts a wage mech-
anism (f̃ , ̃wij ), then it anticipates an expected number of applications, ̃λ. Workers apply to the 
deviant firm until they are indifferent between sending all a applications to non-deviants versus 
sending one application to the deviant firm and the other a − 1 applications to non-deviant firms. 
This approach to a subgame perfect equilibrium is known as the market-utility approach with 
single-firm deviation and is also adopted by Albrecht et al. (2006) and Kircher (2009).8
An alternative approach in an equilibrium with a continuum of agents is to consider a joint 
deviation by an ε measure of firms and then let ε → 0. In models in which workers can only 
send one application, the two approaches yield the same outcome. However, when workers can 
send multiple applications, the difference matters. When a single firm deviates, as in our model, 
workers can at most send one application to the deviant firm. When a measure of firms deviate, 
workers can potentially send all their applications to deviant firms. In Appendix A.10 we consider 
this alternative approach. We show that only the constrained efficient equilibrium survives when 
we allow for collective deviations. However, we believe that the market utility approach with 
single-firm deviation is more appropriate in our setting. This is the approach used in previous 
papers with multiple applications. The alternative approach is more appropriate for models in 
which market makers or platforms offer wage and market tightness pairs and workers and firms 
then choose which submarket to visit, as in Moen (1997).
Suppose that the deviant firm posts a wage mechanism (f̃ , ̃wij ). Then its expected queue 
length ̃λ is determined by the following indifference condition.













· · · qji (λ)
ji















· · · qji−1(λ)
ji−1
max(w̃ij0,wij1, . . . ,wiji−1).
(6)
The right-hand side is the expected payoff of a worker who sends one application to the deviant 
firm and the other a − 1 applications to non-deviant firms. The first line gives the total amount 
of fees that the worker must pay (we do not restrict this term to be negative), the second line 
corresponds to the case in which the application to the deviant firm fails, which happens with 
probability h(̃λ), but the worker receives i offers from the other a − 1 applications, and the third 
line corresponds to the case where the worker receives i offers in total, and the first offer is from 
the deviant firm which received j0 applications in total, and the second offer, if it exists, is from 
a non-deviant firm which receives j1 applications, and so on.
8 A microfoundation for this approach is to start with a finite economy and consider how workers respond to a deviation 
by a single firm and then take the limit by letting the number of workers and firms go to infinity while keeping their ratio 
constant. In models where workers can only send one application, Peters (1991, 1997, 2000) and Burdett et al. (2001)
show that the equilibrium identified by the market utility approach is exactly the limit of the finite economy. However, as 
mentioned by Kircher (2009), such equivalence has not yet been proven for multiple-application models.8






j f̃ + (1 − w̃1j )h(λ)a−1 +
a∑
i=2
(1 − w̃ij )P̃ij
)
. (7)











· · · qji−1(λ)
ji−1
C(w̃ij ,wij1, . . . ,wiji−1), (8)
which is the probability that the applicant selected by the deviant firm has i − 1 other offers, and 
the first of these i − 1 offers is from a firm that receives j1 applications etc.
In a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, (i) given that firms choose optimal strategies, work-
ers send out their applications optimally, and (ii) given workers’ optimal application behavior, 
no individual firm has a profitable deviation. Formally,
Definition 1. In a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, firms choose (f, wij ), where i =
1, 2, . . . , a and j = 1, . . . , ∞, and workers receive their market utility U such that the following 
conditions are satisfied.
1. Worker optimality. Market utility U is given by equation (3), on and off the equilibrium 
path. For workers who apply to the deviant firm, the indifference condition, (6), holds.
2. Firm optimality. There exists no profitable deviation for firms. That is, the expected payoff 
from a deviation, which is given by equation (7), is no greater than the equilibrium payoff 
given by equation (4).
3. Characterization of equilibrium
3.1. The firm’s problem
The firm’s problem can be substantially simplified by recognizing that in equilibrium, the 
posted wage must be one when workers have multiple offers, i.e., wij = 1 if i ≥ 2. As in Burdett 
and Judd (1983), if all firms post wij < 1 for some i ≥ 2 and some j , then a deviant firm can post 
a slightly higher wage w̃ij = wij +ε, which leads to a discrete jump in the winning probability no 
matter how small ε is and hence a strictly higher expected profit.9 This is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, if pj(λ) > 0, then wij = 1 for all i ≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
When pj (λ) = 0, the choice of wij is irrelevant for both the worker and firm payoff. For com-
pleteness, we will set wij = 1 when i ≥ 2 even when pj (λ) equals zero.
9 This Bertrand outcome is the result of ex ante competition in mechanisms in which wages can be conditioned on the 
number of other offers that an applicant receives ex post. In particular, we are not motivating Bertrand competition by 
assuming that a firm can abandon its ex ante commitment to pay wij if faced with ex post competition for a worker’s 
services.9
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sider equation (4). First, the expected application fees that the firm receives can be written as ∑∞
j=1 pj (λ)j · f = λf , because we assume that the meeting technology is nonrival; i.e., the 
expected number of applications that a firm receives equals the expected queue length. Second, ∑∞
j=1 pj (λ)(1 − w1j )h(λ)a−1, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (4), is the 
expected wage that the firm pays in the event that its chosen applicant has no other offers. There 
is a wage w1 such that 
∑∞
j=1 pj (λ)(1 − w1j )h(λ)a−1 =
∑∞
j=1 pj (λ)(1 − w1)h(λ)a−1. Then, 
we have 
∑∞
j=1 pj (λ)(1 − w1j )h(λ)a−1 = m(λ)(1 − w1)h(λ)a−1. Finally, Lemma 1 states that 
wij = 1 for i > 1; i.e., the third term in equation (4) equals zero. In short, the firm’s expected 
payoff in equation (4) can be rewritten as
π = m(λ)(1 − w1)h(λ)a−1 + λf. (9)
Now consider the worker side. Recalling that qj (λ) = jpj (λ)/λ, which implies that ∑∞
j=1 qj (λ)/j = m(λ)/λ = 1 − h(λ), the market utility of the worker given in equation (3)
can be rewritten as
U = (1 − h(λ)a) − a(1 − h(λ))h(λ)a−1 (1 − w1) − af. (10)
The first term is the probability that the worker receives at least one offer, the second term is the 
expected transfer from the worker to the firm if the worker has only one offer, and the third term 
is the sum of application fees. Note that the worker receives the total surplus minus the profit 
that the firm can appropriate, which is equal to the fees it receives plus a term that is zero except 
when the selected worker has exactly one offer.
Lemma 1 also greatly simplifies the problem of a deviant firm which will set w̃ij = 1 for 
i ≥ 2. The deviant firm then optimizes over f̃ and w̃1, its application fee and the wage it offers 
its chosen applicant when that worker has no other offers. The expected payoff of a deviant firm 
is
π̃ = m(̃λ)h(λ)a−1(1 − w̃1) + λ̃f̃ , (11)
where ̃λ is the expected queue length faced by the deviant firm. Note that m(̃λ) is the probability 
that the deviant firm receives at least one application, in which case the firm randomly picks 
one applicant, and h(λ)a−1 is the probability that this worker’s other a − 1 applications fail to 
generate an offer.





− (a − 1)h(̃λ)h(λ)a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
− (1 − h(̃λ))h(λ)a−1 (1 − w̃1) − f̃ − (a − 1)f, (12)
where U is given by equation (10). The right-hand side of equation (12) gives the expected 
payoff for a worker who sends one application to the deviant firm and the rest to non-deviant 
firms. The first term gives the probability that the worker receives at least one offer. The second 
term describes the case in which the worker receives exactly one offer from one of the non-
deviant firms and receives no offer from the deviant firm, while the third term describes the case 
in which the worker has one offer from the deviant and the other a −1 applications were rejected. 
Finally, the worker pays f̃ + (a − 1)f in application fees.
The right-hand side of equation (12) is linear in h(̃λ) with a negative coefficient, so for given f̃
and w̃1, the expected payoff obtained from sending one application to the deviant firm is strictly 
decreasing in ̃λ. Hence, for a given f̃ and w̃1, there is a unique ̃λ that solves equation (12).10
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profit π̃ in equation (11) where ̃λ is implicitly determined by equation (12).
3.2. Equilibrium
We can now solve the deviant firm’s problem. We start by defining the expected profit per 
worker in the deviant’s queue.
τ̃ = (1 − h(̃λ))h(λ)a−1(1 − w̃1) + f̃ . (13)
The expected profit of the deviant firm, equation (11), can then be rewritten as
π̃ = λ̃τ̃ . (14)
When each worker can only send one application, the expected profit per worker depends only 
on the mechanism posted by the deviant firm. However, with multiple applications, the expected 
profit per worker takes a more complicated form.
Keeping ̃λ fixed, equations (13) and (14) imply that the deviant firm’s expected profit depends 
on w̃1 and f̃ through ̃τ . A similar logic applies to workers who apply to the deviant firm. From 
equation (12), we can see that keeping ̃λ fixed, the worker’s payoff depends on w̃1 and f̃ only 
through τ̃ . Thus for a given λ̃, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of utility for workers 
between w̃1 and f̃ equals the MRS of the deviant firm’s profit between w̃1 and f̃ . This means 
that keeping ̃λ fixed, the deviant firm is indifferent between delivering U in terms of w̃1 and f̃ .
Based on the above discussion, we can rewrite the expected payoff of a worker who applies 
to the deviant firm. Substituting equation (13) into equation (12) gives
U = (1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)a−1) − (a − 1)h(̃λ)h(λ)a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1) − (a − 1)f − τ̃ . (15)
As in equation (12), the first term on the right-hand side gives the probability that the worker 
receives at least one offer, the second term gives the expected transfer (from the worker to the 
non-deviant firms) in terms of output and the third term gives the transfer to non-deviant firms in 
terms of fees. The last term is the expected transfer from the worker to the deviant firm.
The problem of a deviant firm reduces to choosing two variables, λ̃ and τ̃ , subject to one 
constraint given by equation (15). Combining equations (10) and (15) gives ̃τ as a function of ̃λ,







h(λ)a−1 + (a − 1)h(λ)a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
)
. (17)
Since h(λ) is strictly increasing, the right-hand side is strictly negative. Hence, if a firm wants 
to attract more workers, it must accept a lower profit per worker. By equation (14), the deviant 
firm’s first-order condition with respect to ̃λ is simply 0 = τ̃ + λ̃ · dτ̃/dλ̃, or
τ̃ = λ̃h′(̃λ)
(
h(λ)a−1 + (a − 1)h(λ)a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
)
(18)11
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condition is both necessary and sufficient and implies a unique solution for the deviant firm’s 
optimization problem. From the above equation, it is clear that the optimal ̃λ and τ̃ depend on 
the value of w1 that the other firms choose. After choosing the optimal ̃λ∗ and τ̃ ∗, the deviant 
firm is indifferent between various combinations of w̃1 and f̃ as long as they deliver τ̃ ∗ (see 
equation (13)). Note that the workers who applied to the deviant firm also only care about their 
promised utility and not the combination of w̃1 and f̃ that delivers the utility.
Equating the right-hand sides of equations (16) and (18) yields the optimal ̃λ∗. For there to be 
no profitable deviations, the optimal ̃λ∗ must be λ. Thus equilibrium requires
h(λ)a−1(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1) + f
= λ
(
h′(λ)h(λ)a−1 + (a − 1)h′(λ)h(λ)a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
)
Rewriting the above equation using λh
′(λ)














In the above equation, f e(w1) is linear in w1. Note that f e(w1) is increasing in w1 if and only 
if the elasticity λh′(λ)/h(λ) < 1/(a − 1). One can show that for common meeting technologies 
such as the urn ball and the geometric, the elasticity of h(λ), i.e., λh′(λ)/h(λ) as defined in (2), 
is strictly decreasing in λ with supremum equal to 1 and infimum equal to 0. Therefore, when 
a = 2, for common meeting technologies f e(w1) is always increasing in w1. However, when 
a ≥ 3, λh′(λ)/h(λ) > 1/(a − 1) for small λ and λh′(λ)/h(λ) < 1/(a − 1) for large λ, which 
implies that f e(w1) is increasing in w1 for large λ and decreasing in w1 for small λ. The above 
observations are illustrated in Fig. 1, where the meeting technology is given by the urn ball. 
The left panel plots the case of a = 2. The three solid lines plot f e(w1) as a function of w1 for 
λ = 1, 2 and 3. We can see that all three lines are increasing in w1. However, this is no longer 
the case for a = 3 as shown in the right panel. When a = 3, f e(w1) is increasing in w1 when 
λ = 3 but decreasing in w1 when λ = 1 and 2 (the dashed lines in the figure refer to the planner’s 
solution and are discussed in the next section).
To summarize, we have shown that if all firms except a potential deviant choose f and w1
satisfying equation (19), then a potential deviant’s best response is,
λ̃∗ = λ
τ̃ ∗ = h(λ)a−1(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1) + f
Thus an individual firm has a continuum of best responses (as long as the expected profit per 
worker equals ̃τ ∗), which includes the equilibrium (f, w1) as a special case.




+ λ̃ d2 τ̃
dλ̃2
. Since dτ̃/dλ̃ is given by equation (17), we have
d2τ̃
dλ̃2
= −h′′ (̃λ)(h(λ)a−1 + (a − 1)h(λ)a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1),
so the sign of d2π̃/dλ̃2 is that of −2h′(λ) − λh′′(λ) = m′′(λ) < 0.
11 In equation (19), we have chosen to express f using both m(λ) and h(λ) because this makes the comparison with the 
planner’s solution easier. This comment also applies to the expected payoff of firms in equation (20). Equation (2) gives 
the relationship between the derivatives of m(λ) and h(λ).12
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solid and efficient loci are dashed. f < 0 implies an application subsidy.
Focusing on symmetric equilibria in which all firms choose the same f and w1, there exists 
a continuum of equilibria. For each w1 ∈ [0, 1], there exists a corresponding f that satisfies 
equation (19), giving a continuum of equilibria that we can index by w1. These equilibria are not 
payoff equivalent as we now show.
Substituting equation (19) into equation (9) gives the expected equilibrium payoff of firms,
πe(w1, λ, a) =
(




From the above equation we can see that firm payoff is linear in w1 and that it is strictly decreas-
ing in w1. Thus different equilibria are not payoff equivalent. Since for fixed λ, total surplus is 
constant across equilibria, the worker payoff is strictly increasing in w1 because the total surplus 
is shared by the worker and the firm.
Next we give an explicit expression for the market utility of workers by substituting equa-
tion (19) into equation (10). We then have
Ue(w1, λ, a) = 1 − h(λ)a − aλh′(λ)h(λ)a−1
− a(a − 1)λh′(λ)(1 − h(λ))h(λ)a−2(1 − w1). (21)
The above equation is linear and increasing in w1 unless a = 1. Note that thus far, we have 
ignored one important constraint: Ue(w1, λ, a) ≥ 0. Later in Section 4 we show that in the equi-
librium where w1 = 1, the expected worker payoff is equal to the worker’s marginal contribution 
to surplus, which, by Lemma 3, is strictly positive.12 However, in the equilibrium with w1 = 0, 
12 We can also prove this directly. Note that by equation (2), λh′(λ) < h(λ) m(λ)
λ−m(λ) = 1 − h(λ), and by equation (21), 
Ue(1, λ, a) = 1 − h(λ)a − aλh′(λ)h(λ)a−1. Thus Ue(1, λ, a) > 1 − h(λ)a − a(1 − h(λ))h(λ)a−1 ≥ 0, where the final 
inequality follows from a binomial expansion.13
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becomes Ue(0, λ, 2) = 1 − h(λ)2 − 2h(λ)h′(λ), the sign of which depends both on the meeting 
technology and the value of λ. For example, when m(λ) = λ/(1 + λ), it is positive for any λ. 
When m(λ) = 1 − e−λ, it is positive for any λ < 2.983 and negative for any λ > 2.983.
We have thus shown the following:
Proposition 1. (i) There exists a continuum of equilibria indexed by w1 ∈ [w, 1] where f is given 
by equation (19). If Ue(0, λ, a) > 0, then w = 0; if Ue(0, λ, a) ≤ 0, then w is uniquely defined 
by Ue(w, λ, a) = 0, in which case, the expected worker payoff is zero in the equilibrium in which 
w1 = w. (ii) These equilibria are not payoff equivalent; the expected payoff of firms is decreasing 
in w1 while the expected payoff of workers is increasing in w1.
Since a deviant firm has a continuum of best responses, a continuum of equilibria occur nat-
urally. When workers make multiple applications, these equilibria are not payoff equivalent. In 
this case, a firm can provide value to a worker in two ways. First, if the firm hires the worker 
when the worker has no other offers, the firm gives the worker a share w1 of the match surplus. 
Second, if the firm selects the worker but the worker accepts a different offer, the firm’s offer, 
even though it isn’t accepted, allows the worker to capture the entire surplus at the other firm. In 
equilibria with high values of w1, the firm payoff comes mainly from application fees, and work-
ers care mostly about the probability of receiving at least one offer. However, in equilibria with 
low values of w1, most of the value in a worker’s application comes from its potential to help the 
worker extract full surplus from another firm. In this case, firms are attracting applications not 
primarily by promising a share of their own match surplus but rather by helping the worker ex-
tract surplus from other firms. In this sense, firms are free-riding on each other. In equilibria with 
low values of w1, the worker payoff is low. In free-riding on one another, firms are exercising 
market power.
We can now contrast our result with a competitive search model in which workers can only 
send one application. The first part of Proposition 1 continues to hold, i.e., there is a continuum of 
equilibria indexed by w1 ∈ [0, 1] where f is given by equation (19). When a = 1, equation (19)
becomes f e(w1) = m(λ)λ w1 − m′(λ). For small w1, f e(w1) < 0 (firms post an application sub-
sidy), and for large w1, f e(w1) > 0 (firms charge an application fee). Only at w1 = λm′(λ)/m(λ)
(the Hosios rule) does f e(w1) = 0. However, when workers can only send one application, all 
these equilibria are payoff equivalent. When a = 1, equation (20) continues to hold. It becomes 
πe(w1, λ, 1) = m(λ) − λm′(λ). That is, firm payoff is independent of w1 so all equilibria are 
payoff equivalent.
No application subsidy in equilibrium We have shown that there exists a continuum of equilib-
ria characterized by (f e(w1), w1). It is then natural to ask when firms charge an application fee 
(f e(w1) > 0) and when firms post an application subsidy (f e(w1) < 0). Under a mild restriction 
on the meeting technology, firms never post an application subsidy in equilibrium. The necessary 
restriction on the meeting technology is the following.
Condition 1. For any λ > 0,
λh′(λ)
h(λ)
≥ 1 − h(λ). (22)14
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that a particular application leads to an offer. The expression on the left-hand side is the elasticity 
of the probability that the worker is not selected with respect to the expected queue length. Con-
dition 1 implies that when the probability that an application leads to an offer is high, increasing 
the expected queue length has a larger impact on decreasing the probability of receiving an offer 
relative to the case in which this probability is low. The above condition holds for common meet-
ing technologies such as the urn-ball and geometric and holds with equality for the geometric for 
any λ.
The following lemma provides an alternative formulation of Condition 1, namely that 
h(λ)/m(λ) is increasing in λ, or equivalently that the elasticity of h(λ) is larger than the elasticity 
of m(λ).







or that h(λ)/m(λ) is increasing in λ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
It is also useful to express Condition 1 in terms of m(λ) alone. In this case the condition is 
equivalent to m′(λ) ≤ (m(λ)/λ)2.
We now return to the question of whether firms would ever post an application subsidy to 
attract workers in equilibrium when a ≥ 2. Recall that f e(w1) in equation (19) is linear in w1
and note that

















Since m(λ) is strictly concave, f e(w1) is strictly positive in the equilibrium with w1 = 1. In 
the equilibrium with w1 = 0, things are slightly more complicated. With multiple applications, 
the last term on the right-hand side of equation (24) is minimized at a = 2 and then increases 
in a. Thus a sufficient condition for f e(w1) to be greater than or equal to 0 when w1 = 0 is 
λh′(λ)/h(λ) ≥ λm′(λ)/m(λ), which, by Lemma 2, is simply Condition 1, a mild restriction on 
the meeting technology. Thus when Condition 1 holds, firms never post an application subsidy 
in equilibrium and we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Under Condition 1, in all equilibria with w1 ≥ 0, we have f e(w1) ≥ 0.
Proof. As noted above, at w1 = 1 we have f e(1) > 0, and at w1 = 0, we have f e(0) ≥ 0. Since 
f is linear in w1 by equation (19), f e(w1) is strictly positive for strictly positive w1. 
Note that when Condition 1 holds, f e(w1) = 0 requires that w1 = 0, that a = 2, and that Condi-
tion 1 holds with equality.15
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In the previous section, we analyzed the decentralized equilibrium taking λ as given. Now we 
allow for free entry of vacancies and assume that it costs cv < 1 for a firm to set up a vacancy 
and enter the market. Then a natural question is whether the equilibrium number of vacancies is 
efficient.
We first present the total number of matches, or equivalently total surplus. Since workers send 
their a applications independently, the total number of matches is given by







A worker fails to match with a firm if and only if all of his or her applications fail. The term in 
parentheses denotes the probability that a worker receives at least one offer out of a applications.
The planner’s problem is to choose the number of vacancies v to maximize net social surplus, 
which is given by
S(u, v, a) = M(u,v, a) − cvv. (27)
The first-order condition for this problem is cv = ∂M(u, v, a)/∂v. In Lemma 3 below, we show 
that M(u, v, a) is concave in v so the first-order condition is also sufficient. That is, the planner 




= (m(λ) − λm′(λ))h(λ)a−1. (28)
When a = 1, m(λ) − λm′(λ) is the contribution of the marginal vacancy. With multiple applica-
tions, a firm contributes to surplus only if the applicant that the firm chooses has no other offers, 
which happens with probability h(λ)a−1. For the urn-ball technology, m(λ) −λm′(λ) is the prob-
ability that a firm receives at least two applications. If the firm’s selected applicant receives no 
other offers, then the firm’s contribution to aggregate output is one only if the firm receives at 
least two applications. In this case, the worker’s contribution is zero.13





1 − h(λ)a − ah(λ)a−1(1 − h(λ))
)
. (29)
When a = 1, m′(λ) is the worker’s marginal contribution. For the urn-ball meeting technology, 
this term is the probability that a worker is the firm’s only applicant. With multiple applications, 
we need to multiply m′(λ) by the probability that the worker’s other a−1 applications fail, which 
gives the first term on the right-hand side. The second term is the probability that the worker 
receives at least two offers, in which case the worker’s contribution to surplus is 1, because 
without the worker, there would be one fewer match. Alternatively, if we remove one of the firms 
that made an offer to the worker, the number of matches would remain unchanged.
Before turning to the decentralized equilibrium, we give the following unsurprising but nec-
essary result.
13 More generally, if the meeting technology is invariant as defined by Lester et al. (2015), i.e., if the probability that 
a particular worker or a set of workers applies to a particular firm is not affected by the application choices of the other 
workers, the same logic applies.16
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Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
In the decentralized equilibrium, firms enter until the expected payoff is equal to the entry cost. 
That is, cv = π(w1, λ, a) where the expected firm payoff π(w1, λ, a) is given by equation (20). 
What complicates the problem is that there is a continuum of equilibria, which are not payoff 
equivalent. Comparing equations (20) and (28) shows that in the equilibrium with w1 = 1, the 
expected firm value is equal to the firm’s marginal contribution to net surplus for all a. Hence, 
the equilibrium with w1 = 1 is efficient. We can prove that all other equilibria are inefficient and 
lead to excessive firm entry. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For each cv ∈ (0, 1), there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria indexed 
by w1 ∈ [w, 1] where w < 1 and f is given by equation (19). The equilibrium with w1 = 1 is 
efficient. All other equilibria lead to excessive firm entry. The equilibria are Pareto rankable. An 
equilibrium with higher w1 has higher net social surplus.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
Note that by free entry firms receive cvv so by equation (27), the expected payoff of a worker 
is net surplus per capita. Thus, again workers prefer an equilibrium with a higher w1. Note also 
that the expected equilibrium payoff of a worker can never be negative. That is, at w1 = w, the 
expected payoff of workers is zero.
Understanding the efficiency result When w1 = 1, workers always receive the full match sur-
plus. Firms do not impose externalities on each other in the matching stage because their share 
of the match surplus is zero. Firms compete for workers’ applications through application fees. 
Competition among firms then implies that in equilibrium, the application fee is efficient. Al-
ternatively, we can understand this efficiency result by analogy with competitive markets. When 
w1 = 1, the worker’s value is 1 − h(λ)a − af and the firm’s value is λf . Define a new variable 
f ≡ λf . The expected payoff of the worker is then 1 − h(λ)a − a
λ
f . We can interpret f as the 
market price of a vacancy, 1 − h(λ)a as the net surplus, and a/λ = v/u as the worker demand 
for vacancies. So, firms supply chances to match in a competitive market at price f , which in 
free-entry equilibrium equals cv .
Excessive entry when w1 < 1 With multiple applications, when w1 < 1, a firm’s payoff depends 
on the choices of other firms. When a firm’s selected candidate has no other offers, the firm’s 
payoff is 1 − w1 plus the income from fees, otherwise its payoff only consists of fee income. 
Excessive entry occurs because as we noted in the last section, firms free ride on one another 
in the sense that part of the worker’s expected payoff from applying to a firm is supplied by 
other firms. Alternatively, we can understand excessive entry by calculating the fee that a social 
planner would set, f p(w1), which is found by equating the expected payoff of a firm to its 
marginal contribution. That is,







which is derived by setting (9) equal to equation (28).17
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that
f p(w1) < f
e(w1) when w1 < 1 (31)
Thus in the decentralized market, when w1 < 1, firms always charge a higher application fee 
than the efficient one. The equilibrium payoff of a firm is strictly higher than its marginal social 
contribution, which then leads to excessive entry of vacancies. The above inequality fp(w1) <
f e(w1) is illustrated in Fig. 1. The left-hand panel plots f p(w1) as a function of w1 for the case 
in which a = 2. We can see that the dashed line is always below the solid line except at w1 = 1. 
Similarly, the right-hand panel plots the case of a = 3, in which the same result holds. Note that 
unlike the equilibrium f e(w1), from equation (30) we can see that f p(w1) is always increasing 
in w1.
Comparing different equilibria We have shown that for given λ, the expected payoff of firms 
is lower in an equilibrium with a higher w1 (Proposition 1). Thus it is natural to conjecture that 
with free entry, an equilibrium with a higher w1 has fewer firms but higher net social surplus. 
Proposition 3 confirms that this is indeed the case.
Because M(u, v, a) is concave in v, net social surplus S(u, v, a) defined in equation (27) is 
also concave in v. We already know that the number of vacancies is efficient in the equilibrium 
with w1 = 1. To show that an equilibrium with a lower w1 has lower net output, we only need 
to show that it has a higher equilibrium v, or equivalently a lower equilibrium λ. In the proof of 
Proposition 3, we show that λ is indeed increasing in w1. Hence an equilibrium with a lower w1
has lower net output.
Why fees are necessary for efficiency The discussion following equation (28) suggests an ef-
ficient wage mechanism: A worker who has only one offer should receive w1 = λm′(λ)/m(λ)
(the Hosios rule). A worker with multiple offers should receive a wage of 1. This would imple-
ment the social planner’s solution with no application fee. However, as we have shown above in 
Propositions 1 and 2, this is not an equilibrium wage mechanism because when f = 0, at any 
positive candidate-equilibrium wage w1, there exists a profitable downward deviation. This is in 
contrast to the case in which a = 1. In that case, since workers cannot pursue multiple offers, a 
reduction in the wage below the competitive search equilibrium level would be unprofitable.
5. Endogenous number of applications
We have shown that in a competitive search model in which workers can send multiple ap-
plications and firms can post general wage mechanisms, there exists a continuum of equilibria 
only one of which, the one with w1 = 1 and f given by equation (25), leads to the efficient 
outcome. In this section we investigate whether this (in)efficiency result continues to hold when 
applications are costly and workers can choose how many applications to send. The externalities 
caused by multiple applications are more complicated than those generated by firm entry. Firm 
entry always leads to a higher matching rate for workers and a lower matching rate for firms. 
Multiple applications always crowd out other workers’ applications imposing negative external-
ities on the other workers. The effect of multiple applications on the firm side is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the probability that a firm receives at least one application increases, but, on the 18
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effect on the aggregate matching rate can be negative.14
To analyze the optimal number of applications, we assume that each application costs workers 
ca . This cost may represent workers’ time costs or the disutility of filling out application forms. 
Note that the application cost ca differs from the application fee f that firms charge. The latter 
is a transfer from workers to firms. We simplify the analysis in two ways. First, we ignore the 
constraint that a must be an integer and treat it as a continuous variable in both the planner’s 
problem and the worker’s problem in the decentralized equilibrium. Second, we take the number 
of firms as given.
5.1. The social planner’s problem
The social planner’s problem is to choose a to maximize M(u, v, a) − uaca , total matches 














The effect of a on the number of matches depends on the difference between two positive 
terms. The term λh
′(λ)
h(λ)
reflects a congestion effect. With a higher a, workers create more con-
gestion for other workers by increasing λ, which reduces the probability of being matched per 
application. The term − logh(λ) reflects a sampling effect. More applications by an individual 
worker increase that worker’s matching rate. The relative size of these effects depends on λ. 
Since limλ→0(− logh(λ)) = ∞ and by a first-order Taylor series expansion, limλ→0 λh′(λ)h(λ) = 1, 
the sampling effect dominates the congestion effect when λ is small, and so a higher a always 
leads to a larger number of matches when λ is small. As λ increases, the congestion effect be-
comes larger and the sampling effect gets smaller so that the net effect of a becomes ambiguous 
and depends on the specific meeting technology.
When m(λ) = 1 − e−λ, the right-hand side of equation (32) as a function of a is illustrated by 
the red solid line in Fig. 2. The congestion effect dominates when a · u/v = λ > λ∗ = 2.66, i.e., 
the right-hand side of equation (32) is negative. Otherwise, the sampling effect dominates. When 
m(λ) = λ/(1 + λ), the sampling effect always dominates the congestion effect so that a higher 
a always leads to a larger number of matches, i.e., the right-hand side of equation (32) is always 
positive.16
We showed above that as λ → 0, the right-hand side of equation (32) goes to infinity. We 
can also show that as λ → ∞, the right-hand side of equation (32) goes to zero. Thus, there 
is at least one solution to the first-order condition. To show that the first-order condition has a 
unique solution, we impose the following condition on the meeting technology, which ensures 
that M(u, v, a) is concave in a when a is below some critical value.
14 Albrecht et al. (2006) showed this formally, see also equation (32).











= g(x)f (x)g(x)−1f ′(x) + f (x)g(x) logf (x) · g′(x).
16 To see this, note that in this case, h(λ) = m(λ) and − logh(λ) > 1 − h(λ) = λh′(λ)
h(λ)
, where the strict inequality holds 
because for any x ∈ (0, 1) we have − logx > 1 − x.19




h′(λ) − 2 = 0 has at most one root λr .
When the equation in Condition 2 has no root, we set λr = ∞.
To see the significance of Condition 2, note that by equation (32), the sign of ∂
∂a
(M(u, v, a)/u)
depends only on (− logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)




















As we noted above, limλ→0 λh
′(λ)
h(λ)
= 1. Using a Taylor series expansion, we also have 
limλ→0 λh
′′(λ)




h′(λ) −2 is always 
negative. It is possible that the function is negative for all λ, i.e., λr = ∞, which is the case 
for the geometric meeting technology. For other meeting technologies such as the urn ball, the 
function crosses the horizontal axis exactly once.
Therefore, by Condition 2 when λ < λr , we have that (− logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
) is strictly decreas-
ing, and when λ > λr , it is strictly increasing. We distinguish two scenarios. First, consider the 
case λr < ∞. Then (− logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
) is first decreasing and reaches a minimum at λ = λr . For 
λ > λr , it is strictly increasing and approaches its limit value of zero. The above then implies that 
the minimum must be strictly negative, which further implies that before reaching the minimum, 
it must cross the x-axis exactly once at some point λm < λr . Next, consider the case λr = ∞. 
In this case, (− logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
) is monotonically decreasing for λ > 0. Our discussion above 
implies that (− logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
) is also decreasing in a when a is small (a · u/v ≤ λr ). Hence 
M(u, v, a) is concave in a when a is small, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Condition 2, there exists some λm ≤ λr such that M(u, v, a) is strictly 
increasing in a when λ = au/v ≤ λm and strictly decreasing in a when au/v ≥ λm. Furthermore, 
M(u, v, a) is strictly concave in a when au/v ≤ λr .
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
Since the planner’s optimal choice of a must be such that au/v ≤ λm and since M(u, v, a) is 
concave in a in that region, the planner’s first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient. 
The solution to the planner’s problem is illustrated in Fig. 2 with m(λ) = 1 − e−λ, which gives 
λm = 2.66 and λr = 4.20. From the figure, we can see that when λ < λr , the red solid line which 
represents ∂
∂a
(M(u, v, a)/u), the marginal contribution to workers’ matching probability of one 
more application, keeps decreasing so that M(u, v, a) is concave in a in this region. Finally, from 
the discussion before Proposition 4 we also have that when λr = ∞, which implies that λm = ∞, 
M(u, v, a) is always increasing and concave in a.
5.2. Market equilibrium when a is endogenous
Next, we consider the choice of a by workers in the decentralized equilibrium. We again look 
for a symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium in which all firms choose the same (f, wij); however, 
now a is endogenous and depends on the wage mechanisms that firms post. Our starting point is 
again Lemma 1, which continues to hold.20
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the figure(s), the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
The expected payoffs of workers and firms in equilibrium are calculated as before, except that 
now a is a choice variable. Suppose that in equilibrium firms post f and w1. By equation (10), 
the worker’s problem is given by,
U = max
a′
1 − h(λ)a′ − a′(1 − h(λ))h(λ)a′−1 (1 − w1) − a′f − a′ca. (34)
Note that workers choose a′ optimally while taking λ as given. Similarly, a firm’s equilibrium 
payoff is given by equation (9), where a is the equilibrium number of applications that workers 
send and λ is equilibrium market tightness. Lemma 4 below implies that the optimal a′ is unique.
The problem of a deviant firm becomes more complicated when workers can adjust a. As 
before, suppose that a deviant firm posts f̃ and w̃1 and attracts a queue with length ̃λ, and that 
workers who apply to the deviant firm send out ã applications. Then as in equation (11), the 
deviant firm’s expected profit is given by
π̃ (̃a, λ̃, w̃1, f̃ ) = m(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1(1 − w̃1) + λ̃f̃ . (35)
Note that for given ̃λ, ̃w1 and f̃ , the deviant firm’s expected payoff is higher if ̃a is lower because 
the deviant firm then faces less competition. Similarly, by equation (12), the problem of workers 
who apply to the deviant firm is given by
V1(̃λ, w̃1, f̃ ) ≡ max
ã
V0(̃a, λ̃, w̃1, f̃ ) ≡ 1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1
− (̃a − 1)h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
− (1 − h(̃λ))h(λ)̃a−1 (1 − w̃1) − f̃ − (̃a − 1)f − ãca. (36)
Note that the optimal choice of ̃a for workers who apply to the deviant firm does not depend on 
f̃ , which means that we can denote the solution to (36) by ̃a∗(̃λ, ̃w1). Once a worker decides to 
apply to the deviant firm, the application fee is sunk and does not affect the number of additional 
applications that the worker sends. The choice of ã does, however, depend on w̃1 because the 21
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marginal benefit of sending an additional application.
Finally, the queue length ̃λ faced by the deviant firm is again determined by the worker indif-
ference condition.
U = V1(̃λ, w̃1, f̃ ) = V0(̃a∗(̃λ, w̃1), λ̃, w̃1, f̃ ). (37)
That is, the queue length ̃λ is such that workers are indifferent between sending a applications to 
the non-deviants and sending one application to the deviant and ̃a∗(̃λ, ̃w1) −1 applications to the 
non-deviants. Before we proceed further, we present the following lemma which contains three 
useful technical results.
Lemma 4. i) V1(̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ ) is strictly decreasing in ̃λ. ii) the solution to problem (36) is unique 
so that ̃a∗(̃λ, ̃w1) is well-defined. iii) For given ̃λ, ̃a∗(̃λ, ̃w1) is strictly decreasing in w̃1.
Proof. See Appendix A.6. 
The first part of the above lemma shows that equation (37) admits a unique solution ̃λ. The 
second part states that the optimal ̃a in problem (36) is unique. Note that in the special case in 
which no firm deviates (w̃1 = w1 and ̃λ = λ), this part implies that workers’ equilibrium number 
of applications, the optimal a′ in problem (34), is also unique. The third part shows that the 
optimal number of applications for workers who apply to the deviant firm is strictly decreasing 
in w̃1.
When a is exogenous, a deviant firm has a continuum of best responses. Both workers and 
the deviant firm only care about the expected profit per worker as defined by equation (13). No 
firm has an incentive to deviate from a candidate equilibrium, (f e(w1), w1). However, this logic 
breaks down when the number of applications is endogenous. To see this, consider a candidate 
equilibrium in which w1 < 1 and a = a∗. The deviant firm can set a wage of w̃1 = 1 and adjust 
its fee to offer the same expected utility to a worker who sends a∗ applications. This leaves the 
deviant firm with the same expected profit. However, when workers can adjust their applications, 
the workers who apply to the deviant firm will send fewer applications to other firms. This saves 
them application fees, so they are better off. The deviant firm can capture some of this gain by 
adjusting its fee. This makes offering w̃1 = 1 a profitable deviation. The existence of a profitable 
upward deviation holds for any w1 < 1, so the unique equilibrium is the one with w1 = 1 and the 
corresponding fee.
The above discussion shows that on and off the equilibrium path, workers always receive 
the full surplus from the job after paying the application fees. We can again use the analogy of 
competitive markets to understand this. Firms essentially supply lotteries in a competitive market 
and workers can choose the number of lottery tickets they buy. Thus both firm entry and the 
workers’ applications are constrained efficient. The following proposition formally summarizes 
this.
Proposition 5. When a is endogenous and Condition 2 holds, there exists a unique symmetric, 
pure-strategy equilibrium in which all firms choose w1 = 1, f is given by equation (25) and 
workers’ equilibrium number of applications is uniquely determined by equation (32). The de-
centralized equilibrium is efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.7. 
22
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probability of getting an offer; second, it increases the probability of getting multiple offers and 
accordingly to receive the full match surplus. The second motivation is a pure rent-seeking one. 
When w1 = 1, the rent-seeking motive disappears since there is no gain from having multiple 
offers. Finally, there is a potential holdup problem in the sense that workers incur a cost to invest 
in additional applications and this may benefit firms by increasing expected matches. The reason 
that w1 = 1 solves the holdup problem is that it gives workers full ownership of the match. 
The corresponding application fee makes sure that the firms receive their marginal contribution. 
Conventional competition among firms is not enough for efficiency. As we showed in Section 3, 
there are multiple equilibria and only one is efficient. Ultimately, it is the addition of an extensive 
margin, the worker’s choice of a, that eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria and leads to a 
unique efficient equilibrium.
For simplicity we have treated a as a continuous variable while working with expressions 
derived under the assumption that a is discrete, for example, equations (34), (35), and (36). Al-
ternatively, one could restrict a to be an integer. In that case, (i) there might not exist a symmetric, 
pure-strategy equilibrium, and (ii) any equilibrium would be characterized by inequalities, e.g., 
sending out a applications is better than sending out a − 1 or a + 1 applications. Despite the 
complexity, one can see that a deviant firm has an incentive to increase w̃1 while adjusting f̃
so that the workers who apply to the deviant can make fewer applications elsewhere. However, 
when ̃a is discrete, then if w̃1 is sufficiently close to 1, ̃a will no longer respond to a higher w̃1, so 
a deviant firm again has a continuum of best responses implying that the discreteness in applica-
tions can be a (limited) source of market power. Nonetheless, even with a discrete, endogenizing 
the number of worker applications pushes the equilibrium towards efficiency.
6. Contract frictions
So far, we have allowed firms to compete with general wage mechanisms that include fees and 
wages conditioned on the number of other offers that the worker has. However, in actual labor 
markets we often see simpler contracts. Therefore, in this section, we consider the implications 
of (i) ruling out fees and (ii) not allowing firms to condition their wages on workers’ other offers.
6.1. No fees
This case has been studied by Albrecht et al. (2006). In their model, firms are not allowed 
to charge an application fee or subsidy so they only choose w1 since, by Bertrand competition, 
workers receive a wage of one when they have multiple offers. Given any w1 > 0, if firms were 
allowed to charge an application fee, they would do so with a strictly positive f by Proposi-
tion 2. However, when this channel is shut down, firms try to achieve the same outcome by 
setting a lower w1. The result is that no strictly positive w1 can survive; the only equilibrium 
is the monopsony wage, which in their model is w1 = 0. When we allow application fees, an 
equilibrium with w1 = 0 also exists. Since there is excessive vacancy creation in Albrecht et al. 
(2006), allowing application fees makes the equilibrium with w1 = 0 even less efficient. Finally, 
we note that our result generalizes the equilibrium of Albrecht et al. (2006) to a wide class of 
meeting technologies so long as they satisfy Condition 1, whereas they only consider the urn-ball 
meeting technology.23
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In this subsection we analyze the case in which firms can only offer a single wage w, i.e., we 
require wij = w for any i and j as in Galenianos and Kircher (2009). Note that in their paper, 
different firms can post different wages. We consider two cases: (i) firms cannot charge fees as 
in Galenianos and Kircher (2009) and (ii) firms can charge fees.
Equilibrium without fees. This case is described in Galenianos and Kircher (2009) for the urn-
ball meeting technology. They show that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. Workers 
follow the marginal improvement algorithm of Chade and Smith (2006) where they send their 
i-th application to the firm offering the largest marginal improvement to their current application 
portfolio. In equilibrium, firms cater to this desire to diversify and they follow mixed strategies. 
The resulting equilibrium is inefficient because some firms have a higher matching rate than other 
equally productive firms. More matches could be generated if workers applied to firms with equal 
probability.
To make the comparison with the results in our paper easier, in Appendix A.8, we extend the 
model of Galenianos and Kircher (2009) to general meeting technologies for the case of a = 2, 
and we show that their results can be extended to all meeting technologies satisfying Condition 1. 
In equilibrium, firms mix between two wages, wL < wH . The expected queue length of high-
wage firms is higher than the expected queue length of low-wage firms, i.e., λH > λL. Each 
worker sends one application to each of the two submarkets.
In general, one cannot derive an analytic solution for this model. However, in the special case 
of a geometric meeting technology, there is a simple relationship between λH and λL, namely,
λH = 2λL. (38)
This difference in expected queue lengths leads to an inefficiency, as noted above. In this case, 
the expected payoff of workers is higher than their marginal contribution to surplus. (See Ap-
pendix A.8).17 Because there are no fees, firms are unable to appropriate their full marginal 
contribution.
Equilibria with fees. In Proposition 1 of Section 2, we showed that there exists a continuum 
of equilibria indexed by w1 ∈ [w, 1]. When firms can only post a single wage, our previous 
equilibrium with w1 = 1 continues to be an equilibrium. To see this, consider a deviant firm. 
Now the set of possible deviations is smaller. It must post a single wage instead of a wage policy 
wij . If it is not profitable to deviate by posting a wage policy wij , it is certainly not profitable to 
deviate to a single wage.
Moreover, now the equilibrium with w1 = 1 is the only pure-strategy equilibrium. To see this, 
suppose that in equilibrium all firms post the same w∗ and f ∗. If w∗ < 1, then by posting a 
slightly higher w > w∗, the winning probability of the deviant firm has a discrete jump. Thus w∗
must be 1, and the corresponding application fee is given by (25).
Thus unlike Galenianos and Kircher (2009), with application fees there exists a unique pure-
strategy equilibrium which is also efficient. However, there can exist other equilibria, as the 
following proposition suggests.
17 This conclusion holds for both our definition of total surplus (equation (26)) and for that of Galenianos and Kircher 
(2009), which is u[(1 − h(λH )) + h(λH )(1 − h(λL))].24
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on the number of offers of their candidate nor on the number of applicants, then for a = 2 and 
all meeting technologies that satisfy Condition 1, there exists an equilibrium in which a minority 
of the firms post w = 0 and fL < 0 and the rest of the firms (a majority) post w = 1 and fH > 0. 
All workers send one application to a firm posting w = 1 and one application to a firm posting 
w = 0. The equilibrium is not efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.9. 
Again it is in general not possible to find an analytic solution, but in the special case of the 
geometric meeting technology a solution can be found. In Appendix A.9 we show that in this 
case, the expected payoff of workers is lower and the expected payoff of firms is higher than 
when firms are not able to charge fees.
7. Final remarks
In this paper, we investigate the efficiency of competitive search equilibrium in a labor market 
in which workers make multiple applications. We allow for a general nonrival meeting technol-
ogy and for quite general wage mechanisms. Specifically, we allow each firm to condition its 
wage offer on (i) the number of offers its selected applicant receives and (ii) the number of ap-
plications the firm receives. We also allow firms to post an application fee or offer an application 
subsidy.
Our main results are as follows. A wage mechanism can be expressed in terms of three vari-
ables: (i) an application fee, f , (ii) the wage the firm promises to pay a worker who has no other 
offers, w1, and (iii) the wage that the firm offers to a worker who has multiple offers. Competition 
in posted wage mechanisms drives this latter wage to 1, the value of a worker’s output. When 
the number of applications a worker can make is given exogenously, we show that there exists a 
continuum of symmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which all firms post the same (f, w1) pair. 
These equilibria are not payoff equivalent. As w1 increases up to its maximum value of 1 (and 
f adjusts accordingly), the expected payoff for workers increases and that of firms falls. When 
we endogenize vacancy creation, only the equilibrium with w1 = 1 delivers efficiency. All other 
equilibria lead to excessive vacancy creation.
Why are the equilibria that we derive generically inefficient? When a worker sends an appli-
cation to a firm and pays the fee, the potential payoff to that application has two components. 
First, if the firm offers the worker a job and that is the worker’s only offer, then the worker gets 
the wage the firm promised to pay when its selected applicant has no other offers. Second, if the 
firm offers the worker a job and the worker has another offer, then the worker gets the full value 
of the match output. When it comes to attracting worker applications, the relative importance of 
these two components depends on the mechanisms that other firms are posting. If other firms 
post a low value of w1, then workers are primarily concerned with getting multiple offers, and 
an individual firm can post a low value of w1 without losing many applications. A deviation to 
a higher w1 is not attractive because it only leads to a small increase in fee income. However, if 
other firms post a high value of w1, then generating multiple offers isn’t as important for workers 
and the firm’s payoff mainly comes from the fees. In this case, posting a lower w1 substantially 
reduces fee income so the best an individual firm can do is to also post a high value of w1. If 
other firms post a low value of w1, then an individual firm rationally does the same. In this sense, 
firms can exercise joint monopsony power, and the lower is the equilibrium value of w1, the more 25
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level of vacancy creation only depends on f , and the application fee adjusts so that the payoff to 
the marginal firm equals the contribution its entry makes to net output.
We derived our main results taking the number of applications, a, per worker as exogenous. 
In an extension, we assume an application cost and endogenize a. When we do this, only the 
efficient equilibrium survives, and the worker choice of a is efficient. Why does endogenizing 
a eliminate the inefficient equilibria with w1 < 1? A firm can deviate from w1 by offering a 
wage of 1 while adjusting f to offer the same expected payoff to its applicants. With a fixed, 
this deviation also leaves the firm’s expected payoff unchanged. However, workers who apply to 
the deviant firm now have less incentive to apply to other firms, so these workers can save on 
application costs. By deviating to a wage of 1, the firm can adjust its application fee to capture 
part of this savings.
The conventional wisdom is that competitive search equilibrium delivers vacancy creation at 
the socially optimal level, but this result is based on the unrealistic assumption that workers apply 
for only one job at a time. Building on Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009), 
we analyze the efficiency of competitive search equilibrium in a much more general setting than 
was previously considered.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that pj (λ) > 0, and wij < 1 for some i ≥ 2 and j ≥ 1. Consider a deviant firm that 
posts w̃ij = wij + ε and f̃ = f + f . The deviant firm can choose f such that equation (6)
holds at ̃λ = λ, i.e., the deviant firm adjusts its application fee so that the expected number of 
workers that it attracts stays the same. Note that f ≤ ε since the extra wage ε is only received 
by a worker if offered the job which happens with some probability, while the extra application 
fee f is paid by the worker for sure. Let ε ↘ 0 (hence the corresponding f ↘ 0), so the gain 
(resp. loss) from the higher application fee (resp. higher wage) is negligible; however, the deviant 
firm still enjoys a discrete jump in the winning probability. Specifically, P̃ij in equations (7)





h(λ)a−i (qj (λ)/j)i−1, which corresponds to the scenario in 
which the deviant firm receives j applications and its chosen worker has i ≥ 2 offers in total 
and all other i − 1 competitors receive exactly j applications (note that in equation (7), P̃ij is 
multiplied by pj (̃λ) and by the construction of f , ̃λ = λ). Finally, note that the deviant firm can 
alternatively choose to reduce w1j instead of increasing f , and the above argument continues to 
hold. 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
First consider (22) ⇒ (23). Equation (22) implies
λh′(λ)
h(λ)
≥ 1 − λh
′(λ)
1 − h(λ) (39)
Since m(λ) = λ(1 − h(λ)) by equation (1), we have m′(λ) = 1 − h(λ) − λh′(λ), and 
λm′(λ)/m(λ) = 1 − λh′(λ)/(1 − h(λ)). Therefore, the right-hand side of the above inequality is 
exactly λm′(λ)/m(λ) and we have shown (22) ⇒ (23).26
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1 −λh′(λ)/(1 −h(λ)). Therefore, we can rewrite (23) in terms of h(λ) only, which is exactly (39). 
Multiplying both sides of (39) by h(λ)(1 − h(λ)) gives λh′(λ) ≥ h(λ)(1 − h(λ)), which is ex-
actly (22).





) = (m(λ)h′(λ) − m′(λ)h(λ))/m(λ)2, which is positive if and only 
if equation (23) holds. 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that from equation (28), we have ∂M(u, v, a)/∂v = (m(λ) − λm′(λ))h(λ)a−1. There-
fore, to show that M(u, v, a) is concave in v we only need to show that ∂M(u, v, a)/∂v is 
increasing in λ since λ ≡ au/v. This follows because i) m(λ) − λm′(λ) is increasing in λ (its 
derivative is −λm′′(λ) > 0), and ii) h(λ) is increasing in λ and a ≥ 1.
Next, we show that M(u, v, a) is also strictly concave in u. Since M(u, v, a) is constant 
returns to scale with respect to (u, v), we can define a new function M̃(θ, a): M(u, v, a) =
uM̃( v
u
, a). Since M(u, v, a) is concave in v, this implies that M̃(θ, a) is concave in θ . Note 






, a), where M̃θ and 
M̃θθ are the first- and the second-order partial derivatives. Since M̃(θ, a) is strictly concave in θ , 
M(u, v, a) is also strictly concave in u. 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: Recall that in equilibrium, the expected payoff of firms πe(w1, λ, a) is given by 
equation (20). To start, we ignore the constraint that the expected payoff of workers must be 
positive. For any w1 ∈ [0, 1], limλ→0 πe(w1, λ, a) = 0 and limλ→∞ πe(w1, λ, a) = 1. Thus, 
for each cv ∈ (0, 1), there exists some λ > 0 such that πe(w1, λ, a) = cv . Next we prove that 






1 + (1 − w1)(a − 1)1 − h(λ)
h(λ)
)
+(a − 1)h(λ)a−2h′(λ)(m(λ) − λm′(λ))
(
1 + (1 − w1)(a − 1)1 − h(λ)
h(λ)
)




The first two terms are positive; the third term is negative. Since the first term is positive, it 
suffices to show that the sum of the second term and third terms is positive. That is, we need to 
verify that
(a − 1)h(λ)a−3h′(λ)(m(λ) − λm′(λ)) (h(λ) + (1 − w1)(a − 1)(1 − h(λ) − (1 − w1)) ≥ 0
⇔ h(λ) ≥ (1 − w1) (1 − (a − 1)(1 − h(λ))) .
The right-hand side of the last inequality is linear in w1 so it suffices to check using w1 = 0
and w1 = 1. When w1 = 1, it is trivial; when w1 = 0, it can be rewritten as 0 ≥ (2 −a)(1 −h(λ)), 
which always hold when a ≥ 2.
Step 2: Setting w1 = 1 in equation (20) yields πe(1, λ, a) = h(λ)a−1
(
m(λ) − λm′(λ)), which 
is exactly the right-hand side of equation (28). That is,27
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∂v
= πe(1, λ, a)
Hence in this particular equilibrium (w1 = 1), the expected firm payoff equals the firm’s marginal 
contribution to surplus, and the decentralized equilibrium is efficient.
Step 3: The equilibrium condition, i.e., πe(w1, λ, a) = cv , implicitly defines λ as a function 
of w1. From equation (20) or Proposition 1, we can see that ∂πe(w1, λ, a)/∂w1 < 0. Therefore, 







That is, an equilibrium with a higher w1 has a higher expected queue length or, equivalently, 
fewer vacancies. Since in the equilibrium where w1 = 1, vacancy creation is efficient, for all 
other equilibria where w1 < 1 the number of vacancies is excessive. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, 
net output is concave in v, which then implies that an equilibrium with a higher w1 has higher 
net output.
Step 4: We now consider the constraint that the worker expected payoff in equilibrium must 
be non-negative. Since the equilibrium payoff of firms is always cv , by an accounting identity the 
expected payoff of a worker is net output per capita: (M(u, v, a) − vcv)/u. Therefore, by Step 
3 the expected payoff of workers is increasing in w1. Suppose that the worker expected payoff 
would be negative were w1 = 0. Then, we know that there exists a unique w < 1 such that in the 
equilibrium with w1 = w, the expected worker payoff is exactly zero, because we know that in 
the w1 = 1 equilibrium, it must be strictly positive. If in the w1 = 0 equilibrium, the expected 
payoff of workers is positive, then we simply set w = 0 in Proposition 3. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
The main idea of the proof is sketched in the discussion before Proposition 4 in the text. We 
now provide the details. By Condition 2 and equation (33), when λ < λr , − logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
is strictly decreasing, and when λ > λr , it is strictly increasing. When λ → 0, − logh(λ)
approaches ∞ and λh′(λ)/h(λ) approaches 1; when λ → ∞, − logh(λ) approaches 0 and 
λh′(λ)/h(λ) approaches 0 as well (see the discussion after equation (2)). The above observa-
tions imply that (i) when λr = ∞, then − logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
is strictly decreasing in λ, ranging 
from ∞ when λ = 0 to zero when λ = ∞, and (ii) when λr < ∞, it is first decreasing until its 
minimum value is reached at λ = λr and then increasing. Note that in the second case, the min-
imum value of − logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
must be strictly negative, because its limit value at λ = ∞ is 
zero. Thus when λr < ∞, there must exist a unique λm at which − logh(λ) − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
equals zero. 
We have thus proved the first part of the proposition.























By the discussion after Condition 2, when λ < λr we have 2 − λh′(λ)
h(λ)
+ λh′′(λ)
h′(λ) > 0. Therefore, 
when λ < λr , M(u, v, a) is always concave in a. 
28
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i) From equation (36) we can see that V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ ) is linear in h(̃λ) with a negative coef-
ficient. Since h(̃λ) is strictly increasing in ̃λ, V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ ) is strictly decreasing in ̃λ. Given 
w̃1 and f̃ , consider two queues with ̃λ′ < λ̃′′. Suppose that V0(̃a, ̃λ′′, ̃w1, f̃ ) is maximized at ̃a′′. 
Then V1(̃λ′, ̃w1, f̃ ) ≥ V0(̃a′′, ̃λ′, ̃w1, f̃ ) > V0(̃a′′, ̃λ′′, ̃w1, f̃ ) = V1(̃λ′′, ̃w1, f̃ ), where the first in-
equality comes from the definition of V1 and the second inequality is because V0 is strictly 
decreasing in ̃λ.
ii) From equation (36) we have





1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1 − (̃a − 1)h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
− (̃a − 1)f − ãca
)
− (1 − h(̃λ)) (1 − w̃1)h(λ)̃a−1 logh(λ). (41)




− logh(λ) · (1 − h(λ))h(̃λ)(1 − w1)(̃a − 1)
− logh(λ)h(λ) (1 − (1 − h(̃λ))w̃1) − 2(1 − h(λ))h(̃λ)(1 − w1)] (42)
Equation (42) implies that since h(λ) < 1, the sign of ∂2V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ )/∂ã2 is opposite to the 
term in between square brackets, which is linear and increasing in ã. Thus as a function of ã, 
∂2V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ )/∂ã2 crosses the x-axis at most once and from above, i.e., V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ ) is 
first possibly convex and then concave. Thus the optimal ã must be unique (assuming that the 
corner solution ̃a = 0 is never optimal so that workers are willing to apply to the deviant firm).
iii) Note by equation (41), ∂2V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ )/∂ã∂w̃1 = (1 − h(̃λ))h(λ)̃a−1 logh(λ) < 0, 
V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ ) is strictly submodular in (̃a, ̃w1). Therefore, ã∗(̃λ, ̃w1) is strictly decreasing in 
w̃1. 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 5
Our first step is, as in Section 3.2, to represent a deviant firm’s expected profit in the form of 
equation (14), i.e., π̃ = λ̃τ̃ where ̃τ is defined by (13) as
τ̃ = (1 − h(̃λ))h(λ)a−1(1 − w̃1) + f̃ .
Combining equations (36) and (37) yields
π̃ = λ̃
[
1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1 − (̃a − 1)h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
− (̃a − 1)f − ãca − U
]
, (43)
where ̃a = ã∗(̃λ, ̃w1), and the term in brackets is the expected profit per worker. As before, w̃1
and f̃ dropped out from the above equation. The above equation suggests that instead of w̃1
and f̃ , we can treat the deviant firm’s choice variables as ̃a and ̃λ. Given the optimal ̃a and ̃λ, 
the optimal w̃1 can be backed out uniquely because ̃a∗(̃λ, ̃w1) is strictly decreasing in w̃1. Next, 
given ̃a, ̃λ, and w̃1, the optimal f̃ can be backed out by equation (36).
The first-order condition for the maximization of π̃ with respect to ̃a for the deviant firm is
∂π̃ = λ̃ ∂
(
1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1 − (̃a − 1)h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−2(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
∂ã ∂ã
29
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)
Recall that the first-order condition of the workers who apply to the deviant firm is 0 =
∂V0(̃a, ̃λ, ̃w1, f̃ )/∂ã. Thus by equation (41), the equation above can be rewritten as
∂π̃
∂ã
= λ̃(1 − h(̃λ)) (1 − w̃1)h(λ)̃a−1 logh(λ)
As long as w̃1 < 1, reducing ̃a strictly increases the expected profit of the deviant firm. Therefore, 
the deviant firm should always strictly prefer to increase w̃1 no matter what value of (f, w1) other 
firms post. This in turn implies that in any possible equilibrium, we must have w1 = 1, and when 
considering deviations, we can set w̃1 = 1. Next, we calculate the equilibrium application fee f .
Along the equilibrium path, the workers’ problem defined in equation (34) now reduces to
U = max
a′
1 − h(λ)a′ − a′f − a′ca
The above problem is concave, so the following first-order condition is both necessary and suffi-
cient.
−h(λ)a logh(λ) = f + ca (44)
The problem of workers who apply to the deviant firm reduces to
max
ã
1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1 − f̃ − (̃a − 1)f − ãca.







= f + ca (45)
The above equation implicitly determines the optimal ̃a as a function of ̃λ, i.e., ̃a∗(̃λ, 1).
Next, consider the problem of a deviant firm. By equation (43) its profit is given by
π̃ = λ̃
[
1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1 − (̃a − 1)f − ãca − U
]
In the above equation, ̃a is a function of ̃λ, ̃a∗(̃λ, 1). The first-order condition of the deviant firm 









1 − h(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1 − (̃a − 1)f − ãca − U
]
− λ̃h′(̃λ)h(λ)̃a−1
where we used the fact that 0 = ∂π̃
∂ã
(see equation (45)). Evaluating the above first-order condition 
at ̃λ = λ and ̃a = a together with equation (34) implies that
f = λh′(λ)h(λ)a−1
which is exactly equation (25) except that in the above equation a is endogenous. Combining the 
above equation with (44) yields the equilibrium number of applications:
−h(λ)a logh(λ) = λh′(λ)h(λ)a−1 + ca.
This is exactly the planner’s first-order condition for the socially optimal a. Therefore, the equi-
librium number of applications is also constrained efficient. 30
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In this Appendix, we extend Galenianos and Kircher (2009) with a = 2 to general meeting 
technologies. The environment is the same as our model in Section 2 except that firms can now 
only post a single wage. We summarize the equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Assume that a = 2 and the meeting technology satisfies Condition 1. Then there 
exists a unique equilibrium with two submarkets which are characterized by wages wL and wH
and expected queue lengths λL and λH , respectively. Each worker sends one application to each 




) = m(λH ) − λH m′(λL) (46)








and where λ = 2u/v, and 1/λH (1/λL) is the measure of vacancies per application in the high-













Proof. This proof closely follows Galenianos and Kircher (2009). The only difference is that we 
have replaced the urn-ball meeting technology with a general one.
Step 1: Worker Optimality. Suppose that workers face a set WF of posted wages and that for 
each posted wage w, there is a corresponding λ(w). The probability that an application sent to a 
job with wage w leads to an offer is p(w) ≡ 1 − h(λ(w)). Define ui as the expected utility that a 
worker receives by sending i applications where i = 1, 2. Furthermore, let w ≡ sup{w | wp(w) =
maxw∈WF wp(w)}, λ ≡ λ(w) and p ≡ p(w). Then using the Marginal Improvement Algorithm 
of Chade and Smith (2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2009) show that wL ≤ w and w ≤ wH . 
Furthermore, p(wL)wL = p ·w = u1 and p(wH )wH +(1 −p(wH))p(wL)wL = (2p−p2) ·w =
u2.
Step 2: Firm Optimality. The problem of a high-wage firm is to choose a wage wH to max-
imize πH = m(λ(wH ))(1 − wH ), subject to the constraint that wH ≥ w and p(wH )wH + (1 −
p(wH ))u1 = u2. We can reformulate the problem as one in which a high-wage firm chooses ̃λ to 
maximize πH = (1 −u1)m(̃λ) − λ̃(u2 −u1) subject to the constraint that ̃λ ≥ λ. Suppose the con-
straint is not binding, and the optimal ̃λ is λH > λ. Then λH is an interior solution and satisfies 
the first-order condition: (1 − u1)m′(λH ) = (u2 − u1). The expected profit of a high-wage firm 








(1 − u1)m(λH ) 
(
1 − λH m′(λH )
m(λH )
)
, where for the last equality we used the first-order condition to 
substitute out (u2 − u1)/(1 − u1).
Note that the expected profit of a low-wage firm is πL = m(λL)(1 − wL) 
(




know that m(λL) < m(λH ) and 1 − wL < 1 − u1. Furthermore, Condition 1 is equivalent to 
assuming that for any λH , we have31






Thus in an interior solution with λH > λ, we have πH > πL, violating the property that in equi-
librium all firms must earn the same expected profit. Therefore, λH = λ.
Next, consider the optimization problem of a low-wage firm. The problem is to choose wL
to maximize m(λL)(1 − wL) 
(
1 − m(λH )
λH
)
subject to the constraint that wLm(λL)/λL = u1. We 




1 − m(λH )
λH
)
subject to the 
constraint ̃λ < λ. Since in equilibrium there must be wage dispersion, the solution of a low-wage 
firm must be interior. Therefore, m′(λL) = u1 and wL = λLm′(λL)/m(λL).
Step 3: Equilibrium. From the above, we know that p(wH )wH = u1 = m′(λL) and 
(2p(wH ) − p(wH )2)wH = u2. We can combine these two equations to solve for u2 and wH , 
which then gives u2 = (2 − p(wH ))m′(λL) and wH = λH m′(λL)/m(λH ). Thus the expected 
profit of a high-wage firm is πH = m(λH )(1 − λH m′(λL)/m(λH )), which is the right-hand side 
of equation (46). The left-hand side of equation (46) is the expected profit of a low-wage firm.
Step 4: Uniqueness. We write the difference between the left-hand and the right-hand sides of 
equation (46) as D(λL, λH ). That is, for λH ≥ λL, define
D(λL,λH ) = h(λH )
(
m(λL) − λLm′(λL)
) − (m(λH ) − λH m′(λL))
Note that D(λL, λH ) is continuous, D(λL, ∞) = ∞ and D(λL, λL) < 0 (recall λH ≥ λL), so the 
above equation admits at least one solution. Furthermore, ∂
∂λL
D(λL, λH ) = −m′′(λL)(h(λH )λL
−λH ) < 0 since h(λH )λL < λL < λH . Similarly, ∂∂λH D(λL, λH ) = h′(λH )(m(λL) −λLm′(λL))
+ (m′(λL) − m′(λH )) > 0. Therefore, along the curve D(λL, λH ) = 0 we have dλHdλL > 0. Since 
the constraint 1/λL + 1/λH = v/u implies a curve where dλHdλL < 0, we have a unique solu-
tion. 
For the geometric meeting technology, m(λ) = λ/(1 + λ), equation (46) simplifies to λH =
2λL. By equation (47), we then have
λH = 3
2
λ, λL = 3
4
λ.
By equation (48), the expected payoff of workers is given by UGK = 32(1 + 3λ)/(2 + 3λ)(4 +
3λ)2. Similarly, by equation (49), the expected payoff of firms is then given by πGK = 27λ3/(2 +
3λ)(4 + 3λ)2. One can also calculate the social surplus in the case: MGK(u, v) = u(1 −h(λH ) +
h(λH )(1 − h(λL))) = u((8 + 18λ)/(2 + 3λ)(4 + 3λ)). The workers’ marginal contribution to 
surplus is ∂MGK(u, v)/∂u = 32/(4 +3λ)2 −4/(2 +3λ)2. Similarly, one can calculate the work-
ers’ marginal contribution to surplus when the surplus function is M(u, v) in equation (26), in 
which case ∂M(u, v)/∂u = (1 + 3λ)/(1 + λ)3. Since all are rational functions of λ, by direct 
computation one can prove that ∂M(u, v)/∂u < UGK and ∂MGK(u, v)/∂u < UGK (note that 
depending on the value of λ, ∂MGK(u, v)/∂u can be larger or smaller than ∂M(u, v)/∂u).
A.9. Proof of Proposition 6
We first claim that the following is an equilibrium and then verify the claim. Denote the 
expected queue length in the submarket w = 1 (w = 0 resp.) by λH (λL resp.) and set the appli-
cation fees in the two submarkets equal to,32
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fH = 1
λH
(m(λH ) − λH m′(λH )). (51)




) = m(λH ) − λH m′(λH ). (52)
The left-hand side equals m(λL)h(λH ) + λLfL, the expected profit of firms posting w = 0, and 
the right-hand side of the above equation equals λHfH , the expected profit of firms posting 
w = 1, and as in equation (47), we also have the firm adding-up constraint: 1/λH + 1/λL = 2/λ. 
Note that equation (52) is different from equation (46), which implies that even though workers 
always send their two applications to the two different submarkets, the allocation of firms differs 
between the benchmark Galenianos and Kircher (2009) model and its extension with application 
fees.
Below, we verify that the above is indeed an equilibrium. Note that by equation (52), we have 
m(λH ) − λH m′(λH ) < m(λL) − λLm′(λL), which then implies
λH < λL.
Thus, contrary to what we had without fees, a majority of firms choose to post w = 1. The 
difference can be explained by the fact that these firms charge fees while the zero-wage firms 
offer application subsidies. For workers to choose to send one application to each type of firm 
there must be longer expected queues at the w = 0 firms, so a majority of the firms offer w = 1.
Claim 1: A worker’s optimal strategy is to send one application to a firm that offers w = 1 and 
the other application to a firm that offers w = 0. To see this, note that the utility from doing this 
is
U = (1 − h(λH )) − fH − fL. (53)
With probability 1 −h(λH ), a worker matches with a firm that offers w = 1, and with probability 
h(λH )(1 − h(λL)), a worker matches with a firm that offers w = 0. The expected utility from 
sending both applications to firms posting w = 0 is
ULL = −2fL
In this case, workers only apply because they receive an application subsidy. Finally, the expected 
payoff from sending both applications to firms that offer w = 1 is
UHH = 1 − h(λH )2 − 2fH
where 1 − h(λH )2 denotes the probability that the worker is matched.
The inequality U > UHH is equivalent to
h(λH ) − h(λH )2 < fH − fL = 1 − h(λH ) − m′(λH ) + m′(λL)h(λH )
⇔ m′(λH ) − (1 − h(λH ))2 < h(λH )m′(λL)
Under Condition 1, we know that m′(λ) ≤ (m(λ)
λ
)2 = (1 − h(λ))2 for any λ. Thus the left-hand 
side of the above inequality is nonpositive, and the above inequality holds trivially.
Similarly, U > ULL is equivalent to
1 − h(λH ) > fH − fL = 1 − h(λH ) − m′(λH ) + m′(λL)h(λH )
⇔ m′(λH ) > h(λH )m′(λL).33
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Because i) λH < λL and ii) (m(λ) − λm′(λ))/m′(λ) is increasing in λ, the above inequality 











Claim 2: The firm’s strategy is optimal. Suppose that a deviant firm posts a wage w̃ and 
application fee f̃ and expects a queue length ̃λ.
Now suppose that workers who apply to the deviant firm send the other applications to firms 
with w = 0. Then the deviant firm’s expected profit is
π̃ = m(̃λ)(1 − w̃) + λ̃f̃ .
Here we assume that even if the deviant firm posts w̃ = 0,18 workers would still select the deviant 
firm and not one of the other firms posting w = 0. This only makes the deviation more attractive, 
but we will show that firms will still not deviate. The expected queue length ̃λ is determined by 
the workers’ indifference condition:
U = (1 − h(̃λ))w̃ − f̃ − fL.
From the above equation, we can solve for f̃ and then substitute it into the deviant firm’s expected 
profit, which gives
π̃ = m(̃λ) − λ̃(U + fL).
Thus the deviant firm’s expected profit is a function of ̃λ only. Optimality requires that
m′(̃λ) = U + fL = 1 − h(λH ) − fH
where in the second equality we used equation (53). By equation (51), the optimal ̃λ is simply 
λH . Hence in this case the deviant can not do better than posting w = 1 and fH .
Next, suppose that workers who apply to the deviant firm send their other applications to firms 
with w = 1. The deviant firm’s expected profit is
π̃ = h(λH )m(̃λ)(1 − w̃) + λ̃f̃ . (54)
The expected queue length ̃λ is determined by the following indifference condition:
U = (1 − h(λH )) + h(λH )(1 − h(̃λ))w̃ − fH − f̃ (55)
When the deviant firm posts w̃ < 1, equation (54) states that the deviant firm hires if and only 
if its chosen candidate fails to get an offer from the other firm. Equation (54) also holds when 
w̃ = 1 because the deviant firm’s payoff comes only from application fees. Equation (55) also 
continues to hold. From equation (55), we can solve for f̃ and then substitute it into the deviant 
firm’s expected profit, which gives
18 Posting w̃ = 0 is a deviation if f̃ = fL .34
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Again the deviant firm’s expected profit is a function of ̃λ only. Optimality requires that
m′(̃λ) = 1
h(λH )
(U + fH − (1 − h(λH ))) = − fL
h(λH )
where in the second equality we used equation (53). By equation (50), the optimal ̃λ is simply 
λL. Hence in this case the deviant cannot do better than posting w = 0 and fL. We have thus 
verified that there is no profitable deviation for either workers or firms, so we indeed have an 
equilibrium.
Geometric meeting technology. When m(λ) = λ/(1 + λ), from equation (52) and the firm 




3λ + √λ(9λ + 8)) , λH = λ2L
1 + 2λL =
λ
(
4 + 3λ + √λ(9λ + 8))
8(λ + 1)
We can then substitute the above equation into equations (52) and (53) to get the equilibrium 
expected payoff of firms, π∗GK , and the expected payoff of workers, U∗GK . These are complicated 
objects, but since all are functions of λ only, one can numerically show that U∗GK < UGK and 
π∗GK > πGK , where UGK and πGK are the equilibrium payoffs of workers and firms in the model 
of Galenianos and Kircher (2009) and are given in Appendix A.8. 
A.10. Collective firm deviations
Consider the benchmark model where the number of applications, a, is fixed. So far we have 
analyzed equilibrium using the standard directed-search type of equilibrium analysis, i.e., con-
sidering a deviation by a single firm. In this Appendix, we allow for deviations by an arbitrarily 
small measure of firms, where by “arbitrarily small” we mean that the mechanisms these firms 
post do not affect market utility.19 The key difference between allowing for single-firm devia-
tions versus collective deviations is that with a single-firm deviation, workers who apply to the 
deviant firm must send their other a − 1 applications to non-deviant firms. With collective de-
viations, workers who apply to a deviant firm can choose how to allocate their remaining a − 1
applications between deviant and non-deviant firms. In directed search models with a = 1, the 
two approaches give the same answer. Interestingly, with multiple applications, they don’t. With 
single-firm deviations, as we have shown in the main text, there exists a continuum of symmetric 
pure-strategy equilibria; with collective deviations, the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilib-
rium is the efficient one with w1 = 1. The fundamental reason for this difference, as we explain 
below, is that if workers make multiple applications, the expected payoff associated with any one 
of a worker’s applications depends on the outcome of that worker’s other applications.
With collective deviations, we now prove that the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium 
is the efficient one with w1 = 1. The strategy of our proof is as follows. Consider a candidate 
equilibrium (f, w1). For this to be an equilibrium, there must be no profitable (collective) devi-
ation. We start by considering “small” deviations from (f, w1) and show that the only candidate 
equilibrium that survives all possible small deviations is the one with w1 = 1. Then, having iso-
lated a unique candidate (pure-strategy, symmetric) equilibrium, we verify that this candidate 
equilibrium also survives “large” deviations. The details are as follows.
19 To be precise, we are assuming that both the single firm and the firms that deviate collectively are of measure zero.35
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viates by posting (f̃ , ̃w1) and that the expected queue that results at a deviating firm is ̃λ. How 
many applications can a deviant firm expect to receive? This is determined by a worker indif-
ference condition. Let Uk be the expected payoff of workers who send k applications to deviant 




1 − h(λ)a) − a(1 − h(λ))h(λ)a−1 (1 − w1) − af.





− (a − k)h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k−1(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)
− k(1 − h(̃λ))h(̃λ)k−1h(λ)a−k (1 − w̃1) − kf̃ − (a − k)f . (56)
With probability (a − k)h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k−1(1 −h(λ)), the worker receives exactly one offer from a 
non-deviant firm and none from deviant firms and with probability k(1 − h(̃λ))h(̃λ)k−1h(λ)a−k , 
the worker receives exactly one offer from a deviant firm but none from non-deviant firms.
We start by considering the special case in which the deviation is small, i.e., w̃1 and f̃ are 
close to w1 and f respectively. We can then use a Taylor series expansion to solve the worker 
problem: workers who decide to visit the deviant firms need to choose the optimal k to maximize 
their expected payoff Uk given by equation (56). To simplify the exposition below, we assume 
that the deviant firms choose w̃1 and ̃λ instead of w̃1 and f̃ , which is without loss of generality 
because given w̃1 and ̃λ, f̃ follows from the worker indifference condition. The solution of the 
worker problem is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose the firm deviation is small, i.e., ̃λ and w̃1 are close to λ and w1 respectively. 
Set λ = λ̃ − λ and w1 = w̃1 − w1. If
h′(λ)




then for workers who decide to visit deviant firms, the optimal k = 1, i.e., U0 = U1 > Uj for 
all j ≥ 2. If the reverse inequality, <, holds, then the optimal k = a, i.e., U0 = Ua > Uj for all 
j = 1, . . . , a − 1.










Substituting equation (56) into the above expression shows that it is strictly positive if and only 
if
1 − h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k − (a − k)h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k−1(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1)











− (a − j)h(̃λ)jh(λ)a−j−1(1 − h(λ))(1 − w1) − j (1 − h(̃λ))h(̃λ)j−1h(λ)a−j (1 − w̃1)
]
(58)36
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as a function of w̃1 and ̃λ and evaluate it using a second-order Taylor expansion around w̃1 = w1










Note that the term in the large parentheses is independent of j and k, and is equivalent to (57). 
Suppose that it is strictly positive, i.e., (57) holds, then it must be that j > k for all j ≥ 2 and 
therefore the optimal k = 1. Similarly, if (57) holds with <, then the optimal k = a. 
Suppose the deviant firms choose w1 and λ such that the optimal k = 1. Then we are 
back in the case considered in the text: the deviant firm’s expected payoff depends only on ̃λ
(see equations (14) and (15)), and the deviant firm’s first-order condition implies that for w1 and 
f to be part of an equilibrium, a necessary condition is that equation (19) must hold. That is, 
if we were to only consider small deviations that lead workers to choose k = 1, then all of the 
equilibria identified in Proposition 1 would be potential equilibria with collective deviations.
However, we also need to consider the case in which the reverse inequality holds in (57) and 
the optimal k = a. In this case, the worker indifference condition is U0 = Ua ; i.e.,
U = U0 = 1 − h(̃λ)a − a(1 − h(̃λ))h(̃λ)a−1 (1 − w̃1) − af̃
and the expected payoff of a deviant firm is
π̃ = λ̃f̃ + m(̃λ)h(̃λ)a−1(1 − w̃1).
A deviant firm receives at least one application with probability m(̃λ) and with probability 
h(̃λ)a−1 its chosen candidate has no offers from the other a − 1 applications, which were also 





1 − h(̃λ)a − U) .
This equation has a clear interpretation. Each worker sends out a applications, which generates 
an expected output of 1 −h(̃λ)a , and receives an expected payoff of U . Since the worker applies 
to a firms, each firm can only expect a share 1/a of the expected output net of the worker payoff. 
The above equation shows that the expected profit of deviant firms only depends on ̃λ, a feature 
also present when workers send exactly one application to deviant firms (see equations (13)
and (15)). For the deviant firms, the first-order condition with respect to ̃λ is
U = 1 − h(̃λ)a − aλ̃h(̃λ)a−1h′(̃λ)
For there to be no profitable deviations, the above equation must hold at ̃λ = λ, in which case the 
right-hand side is exactly the worker’s marginal contribution to surplus. We know from Proposi-
tion 1 that in the candidate equilibria indexed by w1, the worker’s equilibrium payoff is always 
strictly smaller than the marginal contribution to surplus unless w1 = 1. Thus only the efficient 
20 To derive inequality (58), we replace w̃1 with w1 + w and h(̃λ)m with its second-order Taylor series expansion: 
h(λ)m + mh(λ)m−1h′(λ)λ + (m/2)h(λ)m−2((m − 1)h′(λ)2 + h(λ)h′′(λ))λ2.37
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in (57).
Thus we are left with one candidate equilibrium, the one with w1 = 1 and f given by equa-
tion (25). We next verify that this candidate equilibrium can survive any deviation, not just small 
ones with ̃λ and w̃1 close to λ and w1, respectively. Thus, consider an arbitrary (possibly large) 
deviation from the candidate equilibrium with w1 = 1. Suppose workers who send applications 
to deviant firms find it optimal to send k applications to the deviant firms and a − k applications 
to the non-deviant firms. Then, the worker indifference condition is
1 − h(λ)a − af = U = 1 − h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k − k(1 − h(̃λ))h(̃λ)k−1h(λ)a−k (1 − w̃1)
− kf̃ − (a − k)f,
and the expected payoff of the deviant firms is
π̃ = λ̃f̃ + m(̃λ)h(̃λ)k−1h(λ)a−k(1 − w̃1)





1 − h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k − (a − k)f − U
)
This equation is concave in ̃λ, so the first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient for the 
maximum, and it is given by
0 = 1 − h(̃λ)kh(λ)a−k − (a − k)f − U − λ̃kh(̃λ)k−1h′(̃λ)h(λ)a−k
Since U = 1 − h(λ)a − af , the above equation holds at ̃λ = λ, which implies that there are no 
profitable deviations. We have thus shown that the only equilibrium is the constrained efficient 
one where w1 = 1. The following proposition summarizes this.
Proposition 8. Suppose that an arbitrarily small measure of firms can deviate collectively and 
that the total number of applications per worker is exogenous. Then, there exists a unique sym-
metric, pure-strategy equilibrium in which all firms post w1 = 1 and f is given by equation (25).
The intuition is that at any candidate equilibrium with w1 < 1, an arbitrarily small measure of 
firms could offer a slightly higher w1 and they would expect an increase in both their queue and 
payoff. This logic does not work if a single firm deviates because the value of what a firm offers 
to a worker depends on what other firms offer. If no other firm offers a high w1, most of the value 
that the firm offers comes from the chance of Bertrand competition in case of multiple offers. In 
that case, workers are more keen on visiting the non-deviant firms which have shorter queues.
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